輔仁法學第70期

本研究以民法解釋論提出涵蓋自然人、法人、 AI 系統或機器人、強 AI 系統或機器人之侵權行為四元責任主體系譜，並以有意義的人類控制（Meaningful Human Control）理論，充實民法上物定義的支配可能性。其次，本文主張支配可能性概念中的「可支配性」區分四大要件──支配主體存在、透明性、控制性、支配意志──以貫穿，調適傳統侵權行為法於 AI 時代的適用。針對AI系統／機器人，筆者強調（1）在設計階段應由人類明確賦權：透過程式碼法則與介面定義設下其行動範圍裁量框架應屬弱裁量模式；（2）在運行階段必須保有人類承責角色：設計者與使用者共同承擔系統失誤的法律責任；（3）援用諾齊克真理追蹤理論，要求系統在「P 為真」與「P 為假」兩種反事實情境下，對人類道德理由呈現一致回應，並由人類適時介入判斷真值與否；（4）確保人類對系統行為具備最終監督權限：包括即時介入、覆核、重置與糾錯。如此，雖AI擁有自動化決策能力，仍落在「人類意志控制」框架內，並透過理論上建構民法第184條侵權行為四元責任主體系譜、消費者保護法第7條、類推適用民法第188條等學理建構性詮釋，實現損害賠償保護被害人目的。此機制不僅維護法律可預見性，也兼顧被害人保護與技術創新。

關鍵詞：支配性、透明性、追蹤性、回溯性、有意義的人類控制、真理追蹤理論、民法上物

This study proposes a four-tiered typology of tort liability subjects under Civil Code: natural persons, legal persons, AI systems or robots (weak AI), and strong AI systems or robots. Through a Civil Code interpretative approach, it aims to broaden the traditional definition of “thing” by incorporating the theory of Meaningful Human Control (MHC), with a particular focus on the notion of controllability. This notion is further articulated through four essential components: the existence of a controlling subject, transparency, actual controllability, and the intention to exert control. These elements collectively provide a normative structure for recalibrating tort liability doctrines in response to the evolving challenges of AI technology.

Focusing on AI systems or robots, this paper argues: (1) During the design phase, humans must be explicitly empowered by embedding rule-based frameworks and clearly defined interface boundaries, thereby constraining the AI’s operational discretion within a weak-discretion model; (2) During the operational phase, the assignment of legal responsibility must remain traceable to human agents—namely designers and users—who are jointly liable for failures arising from system behavior; (3) Inspired by Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking theory, AI systems should demonstrate consistent moral responsiveness across both actual and counterfactual scenarios, while humans retain the authority to determine the truth value of outcomes; (4) Human actors must preserve ultimate supervisory powers over AI behavior, including the capacity to intervene, review, reset, and correct errors in real time.

In this way, even though AI systems possess autonomous decision-making capabilities, their operation remains situated within a framework of Meaningful Human Control. This legal model is further substantiated through a constructive doctrinal interpretation of Civil Code Article 184, Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Act, and the analogical application of Civil Code Article 188. Ultimately, this framework enhances legal foreseeability and ensures that AI development progresses in tandem with the dual imperatives of protecting victims and supporting technological innovation.

本文以民國初年（1911-1928）大理院如何運用公序良俗之概念作為討論對象，雖然大理院當時並沒有正式民法法典規定其應該運用公序良俗條款來處理相關問題，但大理院在此仍是接受此概念，並透過其判決予以形塑。本文首先將對於相關案件進行整理分析，來討論大理院如何具體運用「公共秩序」與「善良風俗」這些概念，而在瞭解大理院如何運用公序良俗之概念後，本文將試著以德國法之觀點作為比較之參照點，就相關問題進行討論分析，試著展現大理院相關判決及論述的歷史意義，並予以評價，最後則是本文結論，大理院就「公序良俗」概念的運用，雖然論證上可能過於簡短乃至於不夠精確，但還是可以評價為，其仍是可以正確的落於現代法釋義學的框架之中，而且在之後的最高法院論述中，還看的到其影子並仍在發揮影響，以法律制度的引進與繼受來看，大理院的判決確確實實的將當時西方的法律制度與觀念帶入其判決之中，並加以積極的運用，這其實延續了清國末期以來的變法修律過程的成果，並且銜接到之後國民政府的新法頒布，尤其是民法典的訂立施行，可謂做了承先啟後之工作，不過就現實面來看，大理院的工作其實並沒有徹底改變當時社會的現實狀況及人心觀念，但這並不減損其工作之意義。

關鍵詞：大理院、公共秩序、善良風俗、法律行為、習慣法、法律繼受

This paper examines how the Supreme Court in the Early of the Republic of China (1911-1928) applied the concept of “public order and good morals”. Although there was no formal civil code at the time that stipulated the use of a public order and good morals clause, the Supreme Court in the Early of the Republic of China still accepted this concept and shaped its meaning through its judgments.

The study first organizes and analyzes relevant cases to discuss how the Supreme Court in the Early of the Republic of China specifically applied the concepts of “public order” and “good morals.” After understanding the methodology of the Supreme Court in the Early of the Republic of China, the paper uses German law as a comparative framework to further analyze the issues at hand. his will help to demonstrate and evaluate the historical significance of the judgments and legal reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Early of the Republic of China.

Finally, the paper will conclude that while its use of the concept of “public order and good morals” might have been brief and imprecise in its reasoning, it can still be considered as correctly falling within the framework of modern legal hermeneutics. Furthermore, its influence can still be seen and felt in the later discourse of the Supreme Court.

From the perspective of legal reception, the judgments of the Supreme Court in the Early of the Republic of China truly introduced Western legal systems and concepts into its decisions and actively applied them. This work continued the results of the legal reform process from the late Qing Dynasty and provided a crucial link to the subsequent promulgation of new laws by the National Government, particularly the establishment and implementation of the Civil Code. However, from a practical standpoint, its work did not completely change the social reality or the mindset of the people at the time, but this does not diminish the significance of its efforts.

刑事訴訟程序之內涵，應符合憲法第8條第1項：「人民身體之自由應予保障。除現行犯之逮捕由法律另定外，非經司法或警察機關依法定程序，不得逮捕拘禁。非由法院依法定程序，不得審問處罰。非依法定程序之逮捕、拘禁、審問、處罰，得拒絕之。」所定正當程序之要求。然而，從解嚴後迄今，即便釋字第476號解釋：「人民身體之自由與生存權應予保障，固為憲法第八條、第十五條所明定；惟國家刑罰權之實現，對於特定事項而以特別刑法規定特別之罪刑所為之規範，倘與憲法第二十三條所要求之目的正當性、手段必要性、限制妥當性符合，即無乖於比例原則，要不得僅以其關乎人民生命、身體之自由，遂執兩不相侔之普通刑法規定事項，而謂其係有違於前開憲法之意旨。」業已肯認死刑規定之合憲性；不過，論者卻少有針對判決作成之評議程序予以檢討，關於評議之正當程序，在國民法官法施行後，將更引人關注。在公正審判原則具憲法位階之前提下，本文認為，不論是定罪或科刑，均應符合正當程序之要求。在憲法法庭已對死刑案件評議作出一致決限制之基礎上，本文認為在以國民法官法庭對非死刑重罪案件進行審判時，應排除存在合理可疑與牴觸國民參與審判精神之評決類型，始符合公正審判之要求。

關鍵詞：公正審判、評議、正當程序、陪審團、國民法官

The content of the criminal procedure shall comply with due process of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, providing that: “Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. Except in case of flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained otherwise than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be resisted.” Even though No. 476 of the Grand Justice Council, holding that: “The right to liberty and security of person and the right to life should be guaranteed, as expressed by Articles 8 and 15 of the Constitution. However, fulfilling the state’s penal powers requires special/exceptional criminal laws, which are enacted to punish certain offenses in specific fields. They should not be considered a violation of the principle of proportionality as long as they meet the requirements of Article 23 of the Constitution, i.e., the legitimacy of the objectives, the necessity of the measures, and the proportionality of the restrictions (or proportionality stricto sensu). Such exceptional criminal laws, which cannot be equated to ordinary criminal laws, should not be deemed unconstitutional merely on the basis of the right to liberty and security of person and the right to life.” already confirmed the constitutionality of death penalty, few have reviewed the panel’s deliberation process since the lifting of martial law, and the due process of deliberation would attract more attentions after the implementation of the Citizen judges’ Act. Under the constitutional principles of fair trial, this paper claims that both conviction and sentence procedures should not be against the principle of due process. Based upon the TCC Judgment 113-Hsien-Pan-8 (2024) which requires death penalty to be decided by the unanimity of verdict, the fair trial principle requires that, in serious non-capital cases, any verdict with a reasonable doubt or unsupported by the majority of citizen judges should be held invalid.