輔仁法學第69期

德國醫師公會聯合會在2021年5月舉行第124屆德國醫師代表大會，大會決議刪除醫師職業規範範本第16條第3句禁止醫師協助自殺的條文（§ 16 S. 3 MBO），理由是醫師代表大會認為該條文違憲。本文將指出，醫師代表大會提出的理由不足以證明該條文違憲，但該條文的確在形式上有違憲之虞，這是因為禁止醫師協助自殺的規定涉及基本權的限制，根據基本法明定的法律保留原則，這類規定應由國會透過法律來訂定，而不應由各邦醫師職業公會來規定。無論如何，醫師代表大會刪除該條文回歸了形式上的合憲性，而刪除的決議也引發全國各邦醫師公會刪除邦醫師職業規範醫師協助自殺禁令的趨勢。
醫師協助自殺禁令的刪除對於德國聯邦憲法法院（BVerfG）2020年2月26日有關刑法第217條業務協助自殺罪違憲的判決會產生什麼衝擊呢？該判決的核心論證主張刑法第217條違憲的理由在於它對自殺權的間接與事實侵害不符合比例原則，而這正是因為當時德國多數邦禁止醫師協助自殺的緣故。因此，當各邦醫師協助自殺禁令都被刪除時，該判決核心論證的基礎就不復存在了，亦即刑法第217條對自殺權的限制有合憲解釋（verfassungskonforme Auslegung）的可能。此一發展將賦予國會更大的立法形成自由空間，去思考新的保護概念。

關鍵詞：德國刑法第217條、德國醫師職業規範範本、業務協助自殺罪、醫師協助自殺、自決死亡權、理性自殺

The 124th German Congress of Physicians held in May 2021 by the Confederation of German Medical Associations decided to delete the third sentence of Article 16 of the Physician Professional Code Model, which prohibits physician-assisted suicide (§ 16 S. 3 MBO). The reason for the deletion is due to the unconstitutionality according to the Congress of Physicians. This article will show that the reasons presented by the Congress of Physicians are insufficient to justify its claim that the provision is unconstitutional, but, on the other hand, whether or not the provision is substantially unconstitutional, it is likely to be formally unconstitutional. This is because the prohibition of physician-assisted suicide involves restrictions on fundamental rights. According to the principle of legal reservations expressly stipulated in the German Basic Law, such provisions should be regulated by the Parliament through laws, not by the medical professional associations of various states through professional codes, which are of the nature of internal regulations for the members of the associations. In any case, the removal of this provision by the Physician Congress is formally constitutional and justified. No wonder it triggers the trend of state medical associations across the country to remove the prohibition on physician-assisted suicide in every individual state physician professional code.
What impact would the removal of physician-assisted suicide prohibitions have on the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany’s (BVerfG) ruling on February 26, 2020, which declared Section 217 (prohibition of suicide facilitation as recurring pursuit) of the German Criminal Code (§ 217 StGB) unconstitutional? The core argument of the ruling held that Section 217 was unconstitutional because the indirect and factual infringement it imposed on the right to suicide was disproportionate. This disproportionality was largely due to the fact that, at the time, most German states prohibited physician-assisted suicide. Based on this reasoning, the removal of state-level bans on physician-assisted suicide would undermine the core argument for the unconstitutionality of Section 217. In other words, Section 217 might no longer hollow out the right to suicide and could be interpreted in a constitutionally compliant way (verfassungskonforme Auslegung). This development would grant the legislature greater freedom in shaping new concepts of protection.

Keywords: § 217 StGB, Physician Professional Code Model (MBO), Facilitating Suicide as Recurring Pursuit, Physician Assisted Suicide, Right to Self-Determined Death, Rational Suicide
 

壹、前言
貳、醫師代表大會刪除§ 16 S. 3 MBO的理由及其他相關論述
一、§ 16 S. 3 MBO刪除的主要理由
二、醫師代表大會其他相關論述
參、醫師職業規範禁止醫師協助自殺是否違憲？
一、第124屆醫師代表大會相關論述
二、形式審查的觀點
肆、醫師協助自殺禁令刪除對刑法第217條違憲判決的後續衝擊
一、德國聯邦憲法法院宣告刑法第217條違憲的核心論證
二、對德國聯邦憲法法院宣告刑法第217條違憲之核心論證的評論
伍、結論

公營事業的民營化以及放寬管制，可謂係自二十世紀80年代以來，全球政治經濟體制變遷的主旋律。透過這樣的制度變革，國家得以引入較具有彈性以及效率的市場力量，矯正國家直接投入於生產活動所帶來的資源虛擲與浪費。因此，對於歐洲有著龐大公營事業國家而言，真正的政策選擇已經不是要不要進行民營化，而是這一政策的界限問題。其中法國作為歐陸有著龐大公營事業的國家，長年以來一直面對的討論就是這樣的問題。而在民營化的政策辯論中，公共服務這樣一個公法學上的傳統概念，更在整體的政策變遷過程中，形成重要的基礎考量，甚至也在相當程度上，引發有關國家任務與功能的進一步辯論。本文擬以法國公法學中「公共服務」概念的形成過程出發，探究憲法秩序本於公共服務的要求，對於民營化活動所劃下的制度界限。同時也對我國法制中相關問題之討論，特別是正在進行的鐵路民營化相關措施，引入若干得以比較對照的基礎理解。

關鍵詞：公共服務、給付行政、公營事業、民營化、憲法、公權力

The privatization and deregulation of the public sector or public enterprise has been a major theme in the global political and economic transformation since the 1980s. Through such institutional or organization changes, the state has been able to bring in more flexible and efficient market forces to correct the wastage and waste of resources resulting from the state's direct investment in productive activities. For the European countries with large public enterprises, therefore, the real policy choice was no longer whether or not to privatize, but rather the limits of this policy. France, as one of the most known countries with a large public sector in Europe, has been faced with this question for many years. In the debate on privatization, the traditional concept of public service in public law has been an important consideration in the overall process of institutional change, and has even led to further debates on the role and function of the state. On 2024, Taiwan’s governmental Railway Agency has changed it’s organization to a civil company. Such a event revoked once again the discussion of public enterprise’s privatization police. In fact, it is not only an issue of enterprise’s organization, but also an issue of public service: an economic and convent way of transportation, is still a mission of government? How shall we face all the difficulties from this organization change? The jurisprudence of constitutional court has given us what kind of principle in this issue? In this paper, we explore the institutional boundaries drawn by the constitutional order in relation to privatization activities in the light of the requirements of public service, starting from the formation of the concept of 'public service' in French public law. At the same time, it introduces some basic understandings of comparative law into the discussion of related issues in Taiwan.

Keywords: Public Service, Administrative Service, Public Enterprise, Privatization, Constitution, Public Power
 

壹、緒論：問題之提出
貳、公共服務作為法律概念與民營化的對象
一、概說
二、公共服務之概念以及具體內容
（一）傳統的分類
（二）「憲法所要求的公共服務」
三、作為民營化對象的公共服務
（一）不同層面的民營化與公共服務
（二）法國憲法委員會的寬鬆立場：立法裁量的尊重
四、小結：公共服務為公營事業的正當化基礎，亦為民營化的界限
參、憲法秩序對公營事業民營化的具體拘束與協調
一、概說：民營化並非單純的財產問題，亦非單純的政治問題
二、憲法秩序對於民營化的具體拘束
（一）「全國性的公共服務」與公共服務之維持
（二）具壟斷性本質之事業
（三）公共財政的考慮
三、民營化與公共服務之間的協調
（一）本於公共服務維持的考慮，保留國家介入空間
（二）勞動法制以及社會安全法制的考慮
四、小結
肆、從法國經驗觀察我國法制的公營事業民營化
一、概說
二、我國法制中的公營事業民營化歷程
（一）民營化之歷程及階段性成果
（二）進入「深水區」之前在論理及制度基礎上的遲疑
三、司法院大法官對於公營事業民營化的態度
（一）解釋重點偏向組織及人事面向
（二）民營化與國家公共任務之關係，未有明言
（三）民營化是政治選擇問題？
四、小結
伍、結論

2024年，立法者增訂了刑事訴訟法第153條之3，規範就具有合理隱私期待的空間，進行非實體侵入性的監看或監錄處分。由於此一型態的強制處分首度規範於我國法制，其要件及程序是否能夠同時滿足保障人民隱私及有效打擊犯罪的需要，有深入分析的必要。在借鏡了美國聯邦最高法院在Kyllo v. United States 案中關於熱顯像儀的判定及說理，以及紐約州的影像監控法制等規範後，這一篇論文針對這一個條文中，「重罪」原則的規定、發動此一處分的實質理由（相當理由及有事實足認的區分）、相當理由的概念、最後手段性的要求、合理隱私期待的判斷基準、非實體侵入性及科技方法的概念、無人機的使用、緊急情況的規範、事後通知、事後救濟、證據排除規則的適用，以及外部監督等，都提出了在具體個案中解釋適用的具體建議或平釋，日後修法的方向，也一併指出。

關鍵詞：非實體侵入、科技方法、科技偵查、合理隱私期待、隱私或祕密合理期待

In 2024, legislators introduced Article 153-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, regulating non-trespassory surveillance in areas where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. As this type of coercive measure is being regulated for the first time under our legal framework, it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis to determine whether the established requirements and procedures can sufficiently balance the protection of individual privacy with the need for effective criminal investigations. This new provision raises complex legal and practical issues, particularly because modern surveillance technologies—such as video surveillance and thermal imaging—present challenges to traditional privacy doctrines. This paper draws upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Kyllo v. United States, which dealt with the use of thermal imaging technology, as well as New York State’s regulatory framework for video surveillance. These precedents offer valuable insights into how courts and lawmakers can regulate non-trespassory monitoring techniques while safeguarding fundamental rights. The analysis provided in this paper addresses several critical aspects. Key issues include: the principle of restricting the use of surveillance to “serious offenses” only; clarifying the substantive grounds for initiating such measures by distinguishing between probable cause and “there are facts sufficient to justify a conclusion;” interpreting the concept of probable cause in surveillance contexts; ensuring that surveillance is employed only as a last resort; defining standards for assessing reasonable expectations of privacy; distinguishing between non-physical intrusion and other technological means; the use of drones for law enforcement purposes; procedures for dealing with emergencies; post notice; post-surveillance remedies; the application of the exclusionary rule to improperly obtained evidence; and the role of external oversight in ensuring accountability. Ultimately, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive framework for interpreting and applying Article 153-3 in a way that both protects individual rights and strengthens law enforcement operations. Additionally, it proposes future legislative amendments to address evolving challenges posed by new surveillance technologies.

Keywords: Non-Trepassor, Technical Method, Technical Investigation, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or Secret
 

壹、前言
貳、美國法制上熱顯像儀等監看（錄）裝置的使用及爭議
一、以熱顯像儀偵測私人房屋內溫度狀況構成搜索
（一）熱顯像儀的功能及簡介
（二）熱顯像儀在實務上的應用
參、Kyllo v. United States案：聯邦最高法院關於熱顯像儀的指標判決
一、案件事實
二、聯邦最高法院的判決及說理
三、小結
肆、Kyllo案後的美國法制發展
一、紐約州的影像監控規範
（一）影像監控的概念
（二）聲請
（三）核發令狀的相當理由
（四）緊急情狀
（五）令狀的應記載事項
（六）執行、期間及監督
（七）事後通知
二、合理隱私期待及所使用的科技方法
伍、新增無實體侵入性監看（錄）處分的比較及討論
一、「重罪」原則
二、相當理由及有事實足認的區分
三、相當理由的意涵
四、最後手段
五、非實體侵入性之科技方法及隱私或私密合理期待之空間
六、「非實體侵入性」之「科技方法」
七、使用無人機進行監看（錄）（？）
八、情況急迫下的無令狀監看（錄）
（一）情況急迫
（二）法院未補發許可書前所取得的資料
（三）似漏未規定者
九、事後通知
十、救濟
十一、證據排除
十二、外部監督
陸、結論

民法第1225條僅係規定「應得特留分之人，如因被繼承人所為之遺贈，致其應得之數不足者，得按其不足之數由遺贈財產扣減之。受遺贈人有數人時，應按其所得遺贈價額比例扣減」。一般認為指定應繼分、指定遺產分割方法亦得類推適用本條規定。而通說均謂遺贈僅有債權的效力，另外二種遺囑處分行為是否與遺贈同樣，於學說及實務均有爭議。受地政實務之影響，司法裁判實務上曾有物權效力說之盛行。惟採取債權效力說方符合台灣繼承法之學理，學理並指出特留分規定之「違反」與特留分權利「侵害」之區分。
是以近年多數最高法院裁判亦已明確採取此區分，僅知悉遺囑內容，尚非遺囑之履行，扣減權之期間尚不起算；至於特留分權利人仍應行使扣減權方得消滅單獨登記之效力，似又兼有物權效力說之一面。然而，在解釋論貫徹債權效力說下，遺囑既然並無物權效、分割效，則欠缺全體繼承人合意時，並無法單依遺囑為登記而生物權移轉之效果。則自亦無物權形成權作用的扣減權之登場餘地，以遺囑繼承為登記原因之該登記為無效，直接依請求予以塗銷即可。

關鍵詞：特留分、扣減權、遺囑處分行為、債權效力說、物權效力說

Article 1225 of the Taiwan Civil Law only provides that “A person entitled to a compulsory portion may have the amount of the deficit deducted from the property of a legacy, if the amount of his compulsory portion becomes deficient on account of the legacy made by the testator. If there are several legatees, deductions must be made in proportion to the value of the legacies they severally receive.” It is generally accepted that the rule can also be analogously applied to the designation of inheritance shares and the designation of methods for dividing the estate. According to the prevailing view in Taiwan, bequeathment has only the effect of a creditor’s right (obligational effect). Whether the other two types of testamentary dispositions should be treated the same remains controversial in both doctrine and practice. Influenced by land registration practices, the theory that such dispositions have real property effects once prevailed in judicial decisions. However, only the doctrine of the effect of a creditor’s right, is consistent with the academic theory of Taiwan’s inheritance law, which also points out the distinction between “violation” of compulsory portion provisions and “infringement” of compulsory portion rights.
Therefore, most Supreme Court decisions in recent years have clearly adopted this distinction. Hence, merely knowing the contents of the will is not the performance of the will, so the exclusion period of the right of deduction will not start. As for the right holder of the compulsory portion, the right of deduction should still be exercised to eliminate the effect of separate registration. This seems to have the doctrine of the effect of an owner’s right at the same time. However, in terms of legal interpretation, if the doctrine of the effect of a creditor’s right is implemented, then since the will itself has no real rights effect or division effect, in the absence of the consent of all heirs, it cannot produce the effect of transferring ownership simply by registering according to the will. Consequently, there is no justification for invoking the right of deduction as a real-right-modifying mechanism. Such registration based on testamentary inheritance as its cause should be regarded as invalid, and may be directly canceled upon proper request.

Keywords: Compulsory Portion, Right of Deduction, Testamentary Disposition, Doctrine of The Effect of a Creditor’s Right, Doctrine of the Effect of an Owner’s Right
 

壹、問題提起
貳、背景梳理
一、遺囑處分行為之區分或定性
二、特留分違反或侵害行為之效力
三、特留分之扣減
四、扣減權行使之效果
參、鴨兔賽跑：物權效力說與債權效力說之爭
一、債權效力說之基本立場
二、物權效力說之浩大聲勢
三、債權效力說之反撲
四、債權效力說之重大勝利：特留分違反與侵害之區分
肆、鴨兔同體現象之矛盾與解消之道
一、鴨兔同體之矛盾
二、探尋解消之道
伍、結論